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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD FITZWATER, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden : Case No. 14569 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Richard Fitzwater, appeals from the decision 
of the Third Judicial District Court denying his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of 
habeas corpus alleging that his confinement by respondent at the 
Utah State Prison was illegal and invalid. The matter came on 
for hearing on March 25, 1976, before the Honorable F. Baldwin, 
Jr., who denied the petition with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Richard Fitzwater seeks a reversal of the court below 
with directions that he be released from respondent's custody. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Richard Fitzwater, was committed to the Utah 
State Prison for the crime of possession of a stolen motor vehicle 
on October 31, 1974, after being convicted by a jury. (R.9) 
At that trial Jack W. Kunkler was his attorney. (T.7) 
Approximately one month before the case went to trial, 
Mr. Fitzwater testified in support of his allegation that Mr. 
Kunkler was not competent counsel in his behalf, Mr. Fitzwater 
spoke with Mr. Kunkler in the Salt Lake County Jail. (T.12) 
Mr. Fitzwater gave the names of three witnesses on his behalf who 
could assist him in a trial. (T.12) At the trial Anthony Buck 
did not appear and Mr. Kunkler refused to use Anthony Buck as a 
witness. (T.13) Mr. Fitzwater said that Mr. Buck could have given 
testimony favorable to him. 
Mr. Kunkler testified at the hearing on the petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus that he recalled Mr. Fitzwater being upset 
at trial about a witness not being present. Mr. Kunkler did not 
recall whether or not he had ever heard the name Anthony Buck at the 
time of Appellant Fitzwater's trial. (T. 24,25,26). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING 
HIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS 
DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT HIS TRIAL,. 
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Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. 1945) 
Latimer v. Cramer, 214 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1954) 
Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965) 
Lance v. Overdate, 2T4 F. 2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957) 
O'Malley v. U.S., 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961) 
James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1964) 
U.S. v. Gonzolez, 321 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1960) 
Some courts have more recently begun to formulate more 
appropriate standards. For example, in Scott v. U.S., 427 F.2d 
609 (D.C. Cir. 1970) wherein the court held that a Defendant is 
required to show that counsel's "gross incompetence blotted out 
the essence of substantial defense" to prevail on a claim of inadequate 
representation. Several California cases have followed this approach. 
See, for example: 
People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 225 (1969) 
People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 F.2d 97, 73 
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968) 
People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963) 
This test has the advantage of allowing a reviewing court 
to concentrate on a single defense rather than the entire trial. 
However, this test also provides no guidance for determining what 
is gross incompetence but only suggests finding of prejudice once 
gross incompetence is established. 
Some more recent standards have evolved which should make 
it easier for appellate courts to review appeals which bring into 
issue the constitutional right to effective counsel and which insure 
that the right is in fact a day-to-day fact of life in our nation's 
trial courts. The Third Circuit in Moore v. United States, 432 F. 
2d 730 (1970) would measure the effectiveness of counsel by using 
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the touch stone of flcommunity standards" and this way it has 
in essence adopted that part of the law of torts that recognizes 
the duty of care but has dropped the requirement that damage be 
shown. 
The Fourth Circuit has delineated certain positive duties 
owed by defense counsel. In order to meet the Fourth Circuitfs 
test for effective representation counsel must, under Coles v. 
Peyton, 398 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968), 
1. Confer with the client early, and as often as necessary; 
2. Advise him of his rights; 
3. Ascertain all defenses that may be available and 
develop all appropriate defenses; 
4. Conduct all necessary investigations; 
5- Allow himself time for reflection and preparation. 
In cases such as State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super, 507, 287 A. 
2d 234 (App. Div. 1971); Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. 
Ohio 1968); State v. White, 5 Wash. App. 283, 487 P.2d 242 (1971), 
rev'd 81 Wash. 2d 223, 500 P.2d 1242 (1972); and State v. Fulford, 
290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W. 2d 270 (1971), it has been recognized that 
an effectiveness of counsel standard would be more funtional if it 
were more like malpractice standards. Several such tests have been 
formulated such as: whether counsel's performances was at the level 
of normal competency, or of normal customary skill and knowledge, 
or whether the attorney performed at least as well as any attorney 
with ordinary training in the legal profession, or exercises the 
usual amount of skill and judgment exhibited by an attorney conscientic 
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seeking to protect his client's interests, or Mto hold counsels 
assistance ineffective if no reasonable attorney would have so 
acted". These provide a standard capable of application by a court 
since the court could evaluate a particular attorney's practice in 
light of the normal and customary skill exhibited in the courtroom. 
Under such formulations the relevant questions should be whether 
counsel's behavior was such that reasonable, competent and fairly 
experienced defense lawyers might debate its propriety. If such 
debate may exist, assistance would not be in effective. Such a 
finding of ineffective representation should reverse the defendants 
conviction if counsel's conduct created a reasonable possibility 
of contributing to that conviction. 
I n
 State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W. 2d 1 (1973) 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the ABA Standards for the 
Defense Function as partial guidelines to the determination of effectrv 
representation. 
In short, a test which focuses on whether defense counsel 
held up his part in the judicial process and examines whether defense 
counsel in a particular case fulfilled his role in relation to the 
judge and prosecutor is more workable than prior "mockery of justice" 
tests which have concentrated on the trial as a whole searching for 
such gross incompetence that would force an appellate court "gripping 
the arms of their chars" to reverse and remand. 
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The Sixth Circuit in Beasley v. United States, 491 
F.2d 687 (1974) recently withdrew from the "mockery of justice11 
group and now uses a more objective ground. They upheld that the 
assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is: 
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably 
effective assistance. It is a violation of this 
standard for defense counsel to deprive a criminal 
defendant of a substantial defense by his own 
ineffectiveness of incompetence. (Citing cases) 
Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a 
lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law 
and must conscientiously protect his client's interests, 
undeflected by conflicting considerations. (Citing 
cases) . . . Defense counsel must investigate all 
apparently substantial defenses available to the 
defendant and must assert them in a proper and timely 
matter. (Citing cases) . . . Defense strategy 
and tactics which lawyers of ordinary training and 
skill in the criminal law would not consider 
competent deny a criminal defendant the effective 
assistance of counsel, if some other action would have 
better protected the defendant and was reasonably 
forseeable as such before trial. (Citing cases) 
If, however, action that appears erroneous from 
hindsight was taken for a reason that would appear 
sound to a competent criminal attorney, the assistance 
of counsel has not been constitutionally defective. 
Appellant thus contends that under any of the above 
objective standards the failure to investigate and call a witness 
that a criminal defendant advises counsel would be of assistance 
in his defense is incompetence under the above formulations in that 
such failure to act blots out a substantial defense and contributed 
effectively to a conviction. Petitioner urges this court to over 
rule the old Alires standard. That is, appellant contends that the 
evidence in this case shows that all defenses available under the law 
were not presented because of failure of counsel to present 
a certain witness and as such appellant's conviction was obtained 
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without the effective assistance of counsel and therefore should 
be nullified. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that the court below 
erred in denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus because appellant was denied due process of law at his 
trial because he was not effectively represented by 
counsel at trial, appellant respectfully submits that the 
judgment of the court below should be reversed with directions 
that appellant be released from respondent's custody. 
DATED this day of August, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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